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A Conceptual Framework of Impression Management:  
New insights from psychology, sociology and critical perspectives 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper we develop a conceptual framework, based on the concepts of rationality and 
motivation, which uses theories and empirical research from psychology/behavioural finance, 
sociology and critical accounting to systematise, advance and challenge research on 
impression management. The paper focuses on research which departs from economic 
concepts of impression management as opportunistic managerial discretionary disclosure 
behaviour resulting in reporting bias or as ‘cheap talk’. Using alternative rationality 
assumptions, such as bounded rationality, irrationality, substantive rationality and the notion 
of rationality as a social construct, we conceptualise impression management in alternative 
ways as (i) self-serving bias, (ii) symbolic management and (iii) accounting rhetoric. This 
contributes to an enhanced understanding of impression management in a corporate reporting 
context. 
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A Conceptual Framework of Impression Management:  
New insights from psychology, sociology and critical perspectives 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this paper is to identify and challenge assumptions on the rationality and 
motivation for managerial impression management, and organisational audiences’ responses 
to it, in order to disrupt the reproduction and continuation of the line of reasoning inherent in 
the predominant economics-based perspective on impression in a corporate reporting context. 
The concept of impression management originates in social psychology and is concerned 
with ‘studying how individuals present themselves to others to be perceived favourably by 
others’ (Hooghiemstra, 2000, p.60). Using a dramaturgical metaphor, Goffman (1959) 
explains impression management as the performance of self vis-à-vis an audience. 
Accounting research applies the concept of impression management in a corporate reporting 
context to explain discretionary narrative disclosures. Management is assumed to 
strategically ‘select... the information [in corporate narrative documents] to display and 
present... that information in a manner that is intended to distort readers’ perceptions of 
corporate achievements’ (Godfrey et al., 2003, p.96).  
 
The predominant perspective on impression management in a corporate reporting context is 
informed by economics-based theories, particularly agency theory (Merkl-Davies and 
Brennan, 2007). Agency theory focuses on the relationship between managers and investors 
which is characterised by contractual obligations and utility maximisation. Both managers 
and shareholders are regarded as rational, self-interested decision-makers. This means that 
decision-making is assumed to correspond to mathematical models; motivation is perceived 
in strictly in utilitarian terms. Corporate reporting and investment decisions are taken on the 
basis of cost-benefit calculations and involve responding to inputs from the external 
environment. Since managers operate ‘in an environment in which their remuneration and 
wealth is linked to the financial performance of the companies that employ them, 
managements have economic incentives to disclose messages that convey good performance 
more clearly than those conveying bad performance’ (Rutherford, 2003, p.189). Agency 
theory provides a narrow view of impression management as it focuses solely on the 
relationship between managers and investors, focuses on reporting bias with respect to the 
financial performance of the firm, and conceptualises impression management as the strategic 
use of discretionary narrative disclosures. The role of corporate reporting in mediating the 
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relationship between management and stakeholders, and biased reporting of social and 
environmental performance, are ignored. The relationship between managers and investors is 
regarded solely in terms of market exchange (Mouck, 1995).  
 
In this paper, we put forward four explanations for discretionary narrative disclosures. (1) 
From an economic perspective, discretionary narrative disclosures can be regarded as: 
opportunistic impression management. Managers are assumed to manipulate the presentation 
and disclosure of information in corporate narrative documents resulting in reporting bias to 
mislead investors about organisational outcomes. Investors are assumed to be unable to 
assess the reporting bias in the short term. Alternatively, discretionary narrative disclosures 
can be regarded as (2) incremental information, (3) hubris, or (4) retrospective sense-making 
(see Figure 1 for an overview of the economic and three alternative explanations of 
discretionary narrative disclosures). The incremental information explanation is based on an 
assumption of investor rationality and semi-strong market efficiency. The efficient market 
hypothesis states that all market participants have rational expectations about future returns, 
which implies that, on average, the market is able to assess reporting bias (Hand, 1990). This 
assumes that biased reporting (including impression management) would lead to higher cost 
of capital and reduced share price performance. As managers’ compensation is linked to 
share price performance, managers have no economic incentives to engage in impression 
management. Advocates of the incremental information explanation deny the existence of 
impression management (Baginski et al., 2000, 2004). Discretionary disclosure strategies, 
such as the disclosure of pro-forma earnings or the adoption of a positive tone in corporate 
narrative documents, are thus interpreted as useful incremental information, rather than 
impression management.  
 
Biased reporting can also be due to managerial hubris. The word ‘hubris’ originates from 
ancient Greek mythology where it is used to describe the flaws (hamartia) of rulers or heroes. 
It refers to excessive pride in individuals which manifests itself in a sub-conscious cognitive 
bias. Such individuals in positions of power may irrationally take actions or make decisions 
that prove to be risky or grandiose, but which they believe are within their control. Corporate 
narratives may exhibit signs of narcissistic speak (Amernic and Craig, 2007, p. 27), a key 
precursor to hubris. Owen and Davidson (2009) develop a set of fourteen indicators of hubris. 
Individuals who exhibit three or more of these are regarded as suffering from hubris. 
Whereas impression management constitutes opportunistic managerial behaviour with the 
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purpose of manipulating organisational audiences’ perceptions of the firm and its 
performance, hubris constitutes self-deception or egocentric bias. Egocentric bias is ‘a 
dispositional tendency to think of oneself in a favourable light’ (Barrick and Mount, 1996, 
p.262) and arises from the desire to protect one’s self-esteem. This results in managers being 
biased towards their own performance. Finally, in an accountability context, particularly in 
the annual report, discretionary narrative disclosures may also be the result of managerial 
retrospective sense-making. This entails managers providing an account of organisational 
actions and events by retrospectively assigning causes to them (Aerts, 2005). 
 
The objective of the paper is to identify, classify and challenge assumptions regarding the 
rationality and motivation of managers and organisational audiences. For this purpose, we 
provide a conceptual framework of impression management in a corporate reporting context. 
Conceptual frameworks define the main ideas in an area of study and the network of 
relationships between them (Callahan, 2010). Focusing on two key concepts, namely 
rationality and motivation, we relate relevant theories and empirical research in order to 
systematise, advance and challenge research on impression management. The literature is 
either silent, or in some cases confused, about the often implicit theoretical underpinnings 
and assumptions underlying the research. In particular, assumptions regarding the rationality 
of managers and organisational audiences, managerial motivation to engage in impression 
management, reasons for susceptibility to impression management, and manifestations of 
impression management in corporate narrative documents, are not spelled out. We develop a 
taxonomy based on four perspectives, namely (1) the economic, (2) the 
psychological/behavioural, (3) the sociological, and (4) the critical, which provide alternative 
ways of conceptualising impression management in a corporate reporting context (see 
Figures 1 and 2). The alternative perspectives put forward in the paper are not necessarily 
competing explanations. Rather, they represent different ways of seeing the same 
phenomenon.  
 
The paper makes the following five contributions to the literature. First, the range of 
assumptions underlying prior research is made explicit in Section 2 of the paper and is 
analysed by reference to preparers and users of corporate reports in Figures 1 and 2. Second, 
the inconsistencies in some of these assumptions are identified in Section 2. Third, a 
taxonomy is put forward in Sections 3 and 4 which is split into a preparer and a user 
perspective. Fourth, by making the implicit assumptions of prior research explicit, we 
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contribute to an enhanced understanding of impression management in a corporate reporting 
context. As discussed in Section 5, this can be used in future research to make predictions and 
interpret results (Koonce and Mercer, 2005). Finally, by identifying and challenging the 
assumptions underlying the predominant economics-based perspective which entails ‘taking 
something that is commonly seen as … natural and turning it into something problematic’ 
(Sandberg and Alvesson, 2011, p.32) researchers can generate more informed and novel 
research questions such as those set out in Section 5. 
 
Section 2 discusses the assumptions regarding rationality of managers and organisational 
audiences and their impact on explanations of discretionary corporate narrative disclosures. 
Further, the motivation for engaging in and being susceptible to impression management and 
their impact on the way impression management in corporate narrative documents is 
conceptualised is discussed. The taxonomy of prior impression management research is set 
out in Section 3 (preparer perspective) and Section 4 (user perspective). The paper concludes 
in Section 5 by considering opportunities for future research based on the insights generated 
from this analysis. 
 
2. THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF PRIOR RESEARCH 
This section contrasts the concept of economic rationality which underlies economics-based 
impression management research with alterative views of the decision-making and behaviour 
of managers and organisational audiences by discussing insights from academic disciplines 
concerned with ‘the study of men as they live and move and think in the ordinary business of 
life’ (Marshall, 1962; quoted in Maital, 2004, p.1), particularly cognitive and social 
psychology, behavioural economics/finance, sociology and critical perspectives.  
 
2.1 Rationality 
Economic rationality originates in rational choice theory and expected utility theory. Rational 
choice theory assumes that all choices are made intentionally and strictly opportunistically, 
taking account of the expected consequences of each choice (Zarri, 2009, p.4). Expected 
utility theory assumes that economic actors are highly rational utility maximisers who 
compute the likely effect of any action on their total wealth and choose accordingly. 
Economic rationality thus entails making choices which maximise satisfaction, given 
preferences (Zarri, 2010, p.562). 
 
 5 
Economic rationality is what Simon (2000, p.26) refers to as ‘‘perfect’ rationality’ and 
Mumby and Putnam (1992, p.469) refer to as ‘pure rationality’. It is prospective in the sense 
that it involves prospectively generating options. It is economic in the sense that the 
preferences of economic actors are material gain. Economic rationality thus involves 
prospectively selecting the best possible alternative for maximising utility. The preferences of 
economic agents are regarded as well-defined, stable and self-centred. All actions are driven 
by the desire to maximise objective utility functions. When making decisions, economic 
agents use all the information available (Zarri, 2009, p.1). The concept of economic 
rationality is not an adequate description of the behaviour of managers and investors in 
relation to the provision and dissemination of information in corporate narrative documents. 
It is abstracted from the real world which is characterised by ‘uncertainty and imperfect 
knowledge; ambiguous and heterogeneous expectations, abilities, and preferences on the part 
of both management and all the groups which interact with the firm; competing and 
conflicting demands upon the firm; and dynamic and obscure relationships between 
strategies and outcomes’ (Hines, 1989, p.65).  
 
Decision-making in the real world is thus influenced by both internal and external factors, 
such as memory and time constraints; beliefs about oneself and others; and social rules and 
norms. Psychology research shows that managers and investors may suffer from cognitive 
and social biases and limitations which affect their decision-making. Decision-making in 
real-life situations is characterised by bounded, rather than pure rationality. Bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1972, 2000) takes into account that economic actors make decisions based 
on incomplete information, by exploring a limited number of alternatives, and by attaching 
only approximate values on outcomes (Mumby and Putnam, 1992, p.469). Decision-making 
in the real world is not determined by ‘some consistent overall goal and the properties of the 
external world, [but rather] by the ‘inner environment’ of people’s minds, both their memory 
contents and their processes’ (Simon, 2000, p.25). This results in satisfactory, rather than 
optimal outcomes. Bounded rationality thus constitutes a modified form of ‘pure’ or 
economic rationality based on satisficing, rather than optimising (Mumby and Putnam, 1992). 
Bounded rationality explains why investors are prone to cognitive and social biases and thus 
are susceptible to impression management. It explains why managers may assess their own 
abilities in a biased manner manifesting itself in hubris –‘exaggerated pride or self-
confidence’ (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997, p.106).  
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Both economic rationality and bounded rationality regard decision-making as a cognitive 
activity which excludes affective components. Research in behavioural finance and 
psychology suggests that emotional factors play a significant role in decision-making. For 
example, decision-outcomes may be enhanced by drawing on emotional resources, such as 
‘gut feeling’. By contrast, feelings such as anxiety and stress may negatively affect decision-
outcomes. In real-life situations, decision-making is likely to be a holistic process which 
combines cognitive and emotional factors (see for example Daniel et al., 2002).1  
 
Both economic rationality and bounded rationality are types of instrumental rationality or 
rationality of means which involves ‘applying appropriate reason to choose the best possible 
means to attain one’s ends’ (Tomer, 2008, p.1704). In this context, decisions not based on the 
best possible means to achieve given ends are considered irrational. Decision-making always 
takes place in a social context and is thus influenced by social norms and rules. This requires 
a shift from instrumental rationality to substantive rationality which is concerned with ideals, 
goals and ends which are pursued for their own sake, such as equality, justice, freedom, 
respect for the environment (Weber, 1968). Substantive rationality is a rationality of ends 
which involves applying appropriate reason to achieve these ends (Bolan, 1999, p.71). In the 
context of corporate reporting, substantive rationality addresses mainly social and 
environmental issues, such as fair trade, equality in the workplace and pollution. Firms are 
assumed to engage in impression management during incidents which violate social norms 
and rules, such as accidents (e.g., Hooghiemstra, 2000), product safety and health incidents 
(Elsbach, 1994) and corporate scandals (Breton and Cote, 2006; Linsley and Kajüter, 2008). 
In addition, critical researchers regard the notion of rationality as socially constructed (Hines, 
1989; Lodh and Gaffikin, 1997). When making decisions, managers give the impression of 
rationality in order to be seen to conforming to the rules and norms of society and to forestall 
the interference of external agencies in the operation of the organisation (Hines, 1989). This 
may entail the use of accounting logic (Broadbent, 1998) to persuade organisational 
audiences of the validity and necessity of potentially controversial actions and decisions, such 
as privatisation (Craig and Amernic, 2004b, 2006, 2008).  
 
                                                          
1 The dichotomy between cognitive and emotional factors can be traced back to the Cartesian model of the 
mind. Descartes regarded rationality and emotions to be distinct spheres (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). However, 
emotions, which are associated with the realm of the body, can influence the mind. 
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2.2 Motivation 
Explanations of the behaviour of managers and organisational audiences are dependent on the 
way the relationship of the organisation with its environment is conceptualised.2 Both 
managers’ motives to engage in impression management and investors’ motives to act on the 
information provided can be regarded as independent of institutional and social context or 
dependent on it. Impression management and responses to it can thus be regarded as 
determined by economic (e.g., utility maximisation) or psychological (e.g., the desire to 
maximise rewards and minimise sanctions, peer pressure) factors or external constraints, such 
as social norms and rules (e.g., social legitimacy) or belief systems (e.g., capitalism).  
 
The concept of economic rationality which underlies the majority of impression management 
research assumes that mangers’ motives to provide corporate narrative disclosures and to 
engage in impression management and investors’ motives to act on the information provided 
are driven by utility maximisation, i.e. increased compensation in the form of salary and 
bonuses for management and future cash flows for investors. Economic agents may engage in 
rational behaviour in the sense that they choose the best possible means to achieve their ends, 
but the ends are not necessarily ‘what economists had supposed’ (Camerer et al., 2003, 
p.1216; quoted in Zarri, 2009, p.2). Research in social psychology indicates that impression 
management may be motivated by the social ‘presence’ of others whose behaviour 
management is trying to anticipate (Allport, 1954, p.5). Managers may be prompted to 
engage in impression management anticipating that shareholders and stakeholders may 
otherwise respond in undesired ways, for example, in the form of unfavourable analyst 
reports, credit ratings, or news reports (Prakash and Rappaport, 1977) or in the form of 
withdrawing community support from the firm. Impression management thus serves to 
counteract such possible negative consequences by controlling the perceptions of 
organisational audiences either by biasing the presentation or disclosure of information 
before it is released (reporting bias) or by biasing the descriptions of causality of 
organisational actions and events (self-serving bias). 
 
                                                          
2 The predominant economics-based perspective on impression management is based on a closed-system 
concept of the organisation as ‘separate from its environment and encompassing a set of stable and easily 
identifiable participants’ (Scott and Davis, 2007, p.31). By contrast, the alternative perspectives (particularly the 
sociological and critical perspectives) introduced in this paper are based on an open-system concept of the 
organisation as being shaped, supported and infiltrated by its environment (Scott and Davis, 2007).   
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Alternatively, managers may be prompted to engage in impression management in order to 
respond to the concerns of various stakeholder groups (stakeholder theory) or to conform to 
social rules and norms (legitimacy theory) (Ng and Tseng, 2008). Managers may adopt 
strategies to make their organisational processes or institutionalised practices appear to 
conform to social norms and rules (symbolic management) (Boland and Pondy, 1983, p.223; 
Ashforth and Gibbs 1990). This is particularly prevalent with respect to social and 
environmental reporting where managers may use rhetoric to persuade organisational 
audiences of the environmental credentials of the organisation (Livesey, 2002; Alexander, 
2009). In this case, impression management is regarded as addressing the substantive 
rationality concerns of external parties. Managers may engage in impression management as 
a means of legitimising actions and in order to justify decisions (Hooghiemstra, 2000, Aerts 
and Cormier, 2009), to deflect criticism (Prasad and Mir, 2002), and to forestall interference 
by external parties such as trade unions, government agencies and environmental groups 
(Hines, 1989). 
 
In the same vein, investor behaviour may be determined by social context and thus is driven 
by the behaviour of others, manifesting itself in peer pressure and group acceptance. 
Investment decisions can be regarded as influenced by consensus judgements and by herd 
behaviour. As investors operate in a social context, their decisions may be influenced by 
social norms and rules. This means that they may be guided by substantive rationality in the 
sense that they use appropriate reason to pursue ends for their own sake, such as investing in 
companies addressing social and environmental concerns (Nicholls and Paton, 2010). 
 
2.3 Concepts of impression management  
Assumptions of rationality and motivation impact on the way impression management is 
conceptualised. Economic rationality assumes that impression management is regarded as the 
result of rational purpose-driven behaviour of managers who aim to maximise their utility. It 
entails managers introducing reporting bias into corporate narrative documents by 
manipulating the presentation and disclosure of information. By contrast, if impression 
management is regarded as prompted by the (imagined) presence of shareholders and 
stakeholders who judge managerial performance, it is conceptualised as self-serving bias 
executed by attributing positive organisational outcomes to internal factors and negative 
organisational outcomes to external circumstances (Aerts, 1994, 2001; Clatworthy and Jones, 
2003).  
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Alternatively, if impression management is regarded as addressing the substantive rationality 
concerns of organisational audiences, it is conceptualised as symbolic management. Ashforth 
and Gibbs (1990) differentiate between substantive and symbolic management. Substantive 
management entails a real change in organisational processes or institutionalised practices, 
including corporate reporting. This includes normative, coercive or mimetic isomorphism and 
involves, for example, increasing the quantity and quality of environmental information 
provided due to stakeholder demand, increasing environmental awareness in society or 
environmental reporting practices by other firms. By contrast, symbolic management entails 
adopting strategies which make the organisation appear to respond to stakeholder concerns or 
to be congruent with society’s norms and expectations. Symbolic management strategies 
include (i) espousing socially acceptable goals, (ii) redefining means as ends, and (iii) 
ceremonial conformity (i.e. adopting specific practices considered consistent with rational 
management, even though they do not improve organisational practices). Firms facing a 
major legitimacy threat engage in symbolic management by separating the negative event 
(e.g., fraud, scandal, product safety issue) from the organisation as a whole by normalising 
accounts (e.g., excuse, apology, justification) and strategic restructuring (e.g. executive 
replacement, establishment of monitors or watchdogs). Finally, if rationality is regarded as a 
social construct which lends legitimacy to decisions and actions, then impression 
management entails conveying an image of organisational rationality by means of 
retrospectively assigning causes to events or by means of using accounting concepts or 
numbers to frame managerial decisions or organisational outcomes (Aerts, 2005). 
 
2.4 Development of taxonomy  
We develop a taxonomy based on four theoretical perspectives to explain managerial 
impression management (Figure 1) and the responses of organisational audiences to 
impression management (Figure 2), namely (1) the economic, 2) the 
psychological/behavioural, (3) the sociological, and (4) the critical. These perspectives are 
based on different assumptions regarding the type of rationality underlying the behaviour of 
managers and organisational audiences and the motivation for providing discretionary 
corporate narrative disclosures. They result in conceptualising discretionary narrative 
disclosures in corporate narrative documents, including impression management, in different 
ways. 
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As set out in the introduction, there are four explanations for discretionary corporate narrative 
disclosures: (1) incremental information, (2) impression management, (3) hubris, and (4) 
retrospective sense-making. One strand of research denies the existence of impression 
management and regards discretionary narrative disclosures as incremental information 
provided to aid investor decision-making. If both managers and investors are driven by 
economic rationality, managers have no motivation to engage in earnings management (and 
by extension impression management), as investors are able to ‘undo’ (Healy and Wahlen, 
1999, p.369) reporting bias. Rather, managers are assumed to engage in unbiased reporting as 
this enhances managerial reputation and compensation (Baginski et al., 2000).3 Alternatively, 
if managers are assumed to be driven by economic rationality and investors by bounded 
rationality, discretionary narrative disclosures constitute impression management. In this 
scenario, self-interested managers are assumed to exploit information asymmetries by 
releasing biased information. They may then benefit from increased compensation, via share 
options (Adelberg, 1979; Rutherford, 2003; Courtis, 2004a). Cognitive constraints render 
investors unable to undo reporting bias. As a result, they revise their expectations regarding 
future cash flows, resulting in short-term capital misallocations. Finally, if managers are 
assumed to be driven by bounded rationality which biases them towards their own abilities 
and performance, discretionary narrative disclosures are regarded as hubris.  
 
Following an economics-based perspective, managerial performance attributions in corporate 
narrative documents are assumed to constitute incremental information. Managers have 
strong incentives to engage in unbiased reporting, as it enhances their reputation and 
compensation (Baginski et al., 2000) and investors weigh disclosures by the credibility of 
their sources (Kothari et al., 2009). For example, the purpose of performance attributions in 
management forecasts is to hasten the investor expectation adjustment process. By contrast, 
Staw et al. (1983) and Lee et al. (2004) assume that rational utility-maximising managers use 
self-serving performance attributions in corporate narratives in order to manipulate investor 
perceptions of the financial performance of the firm. In a corporate reporting context, the 
focus is on organisational outcomes which may either be attributed to internal factors (i.e. 
ability, knowledge) or to external circumstances (i.e. macro-economic factors, competition). 
Attributions are assumed to be biased, if positive organisational outcomes are attributed to 
                                                          
3 Another strand of research does not deny the existence of impression m management, but regards reporting 
bias as ‘cheap talk’ (Benabou and Laroque, 1992) which is ignored by investors (see Figure 2). 
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internal circumstances and negative organisational outcomes to external circumstances. 
Investors are assumed to be susceptible to impression management and thus exhibit bounded 
rather than economic rationality.  
 
Psychological explanations of discretionary corporate narrative disclosures are based on 
attribution theory (Heider, 1958; Jones and Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967). Attribution theory is 
concerned with people’s explanations of events. Biased performance attributions are regarded 
as motivated either by socio-psychological or by cognitive-psychological factors. The first 
interprets biased performance attributions as impression management arising from the 
anticipation of potential negative consequences of information releases. This drives managers 
to selectively manipulate the descriptions of causality of performance attributions resulting in 
self-serving bias. The second regards biased performance attributions as egocentric bias or 
hubris arising from the cognitive dissonance between self-image and the evidence of 
performance. It reflects a genuine but biased self-assessment arising from a desire to protect 
one’s self-image. Egocentric bias is the result of managerial overconfidence or optimism, 
rather than a deliberate attempt on the part of management to present organisational 
performance in the best possible light (Frink and Ferris, 1998).  
 
Alternatively, attributions may serve an explanatory, rather than a self-serving function. Due 
to people’s desire to achieve some control over the social world, they explain events by 
means of cause-effect relationships (Forsyth, 1980). In a corporate reporting context this is 
referred to as retrospective sense-making (Aerts, 2005). Performance attributions in corporate 
reports may be used (i) proactively to shape organisational audiences’ perceptions of 
organisational outcomes and events (impression management); (ii) to protect, maintain, or 
further beliefs about the self or the organisation (hubris) or (iii) retrospectively to provide an 
account of events (retrospective sense-making). This entails the use of retrospective, rather 
than prospective rationality. Instrumental rationality is prospective in the sense that it entails 
prospectively selecting relevant causal factors and desired outcomes based on a 
comprehensive understanding of the situation (Boland and Pondy, 1983). By contrast, 
retrospective rationality entails the ex-post rationalisation of decisions in order to give the 
impression of rational decision-making (Aerts, 2005). As the psychological perspective 
regards market participants as characterised by bounded rationality, investors are assumed to 
be susceptible to impression management.  
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Sociological explanations of discretionary corporate narrative disclosures are based on 
legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and institutional theory and regard managerial 
disclosure behaviour as responding to stakeholder concerns and as a means of demonstrating 
organisational legitimacy. Whereas economic and psychological concepts of impression 
management regard the concerns of organisational audiences with corporate narrative reports 
as driven by instrumental rationality, sociological interpretations see them as motivated by 
substantive rationality. Impression management arises in situations where the norms and 
values of the firm are inconsistent with those of society (Luft Mobus, 2005, p.495). This 
causes managers to engage in symbolic management (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990) to 
(re)establish social legitimacy. As the sociological perspective is concerned with the role of 
corporate narrative reports in demonstrating the organisation’s congruence with social norms 
and values, it makes no assumptions regarding the instrumental rationality of organisational 
audiences and thus their susceptibility to impression management. 
 
Critical perspectives on discretionary corporate narrative disclosures regard the notion of 
rationality as socially constructed in the sense that rationality ‘does not intrinsically exist in a 
decision or situation, but is socially conferred upon it’ (Hines, 1989, p.66). Rationality may 
be viewed as socially constructed meaning which provides sets of rules for meaningful 
action. Rationality is a normative construct of acceptable behaviour in organisations (Mumby 
and Putnam, 1992). When making decisions, managers have to be seen to be acting 
rationally. In this context, impression management entails presenting an image of the 
organisation as a rational entity, often by means of rationalising decisions in order to gain or 
maintain social legitimacy. This involves presenting organisational outcomes and events in 
corporate narrative documents as resulting from intentional, reasoned and goal-directed 
behaviour (Mumby and Putnam, 1992).  
 
All four perspectives are based on different concepts of impression management. The 
economics-based perspective views impression management as inconsistencies between 
reported and actual organisational outcomes and thus conceptualises it as reporting bias. The 
psychology-based perspective views impression management as inconsistencies between 
reported and actual performance attributions and regards it as self-serving bias. Systems-
oriented theories regard impression management as inconsistencies between portrayed and 
actual values and conceptualise it as symbolic management. Critical perspectives regard 
impression management as inconsistencies between portrayed and actual organisational 
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decision-making. Impression management is thus conceptualised as retrospective rationality 
and accounting rhetoric.  
 
 
3. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON MANAGERIAL IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT 
In this section we consider the four perspectives on managerial impression management 
summarised in Figure 1.  
 
The assumptions of the predominant economic perspective on managerial impression 
management with respect to decision-making and motivation are contrasted with those of 
three alternative perspectives, namely cognitive and social psychology, sociology and critical 
perspectives. This enriches our understanding of impression management in a corporate 
reporting context by providing us with alternative explanations of managerial impression 
management. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates that altering assumptions of managerial rationality from ‘pure’ rationality 
to bounded rationality results in biased discretionary narrative disclosures to be 
conceptualised as hubris, rather than impression management. By contrast, altering 
assumptions of managerial motivation from opportunistic (material self-interest in the form 
of increased compensation) to informational (decreasing the cost of capital by means of 
improved decision-making) results in an alternative explanation of discretionary narrative 
disclosures as useful incremental information, rather than impression management. Switching 
from instrumental rationality to substantive rationality or rationality as a social construct 
leads to alternative concepts of impression management as symbolic management or 
retrospective rationality and accounting rhetoric.  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
 
3.1. Economic perspective 
The economic perspective regards impression management as a strand of the financial 
disclosure literature. Impression management is conceptualised as biased discretionary 
narrative disclosures. Managers and investors are assumed to strategically compete for wealth 
and thus use the information in corporate narrative documents as a factor of production with 
respect to that wealth (Arrington and Puxty, 1991, p.34). Impression management thus entails 
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managers taking advantage of information asymmetries by means of manipulating the 
presentation and disclosure of information with the purpose of maximising their personal 
wealth (Adelberg, 1979; Rutherford, 2003; Courtis, 2004a). Corporate narrative documents 
serve as impression management vehicles to present a self-interested view of corporate 
performance (Bettman and Weitz, 1983, p.166-167; Staw et al., 1983, p.584; Abrahamson 
and Park, 1994, p.1302; Mather et al., 2000, p.68; Clatworthy and Jones, 2006, p.493). As 
negative organisational outcomes may give rise to conflicts of interest between managers and 
shareholders, managers are assumed to ‘distort readers’ perceptions of corporate 
achievements’ (Godfrey et al., 2003, p.96) by means of obfuscating failures and emphasising 
successes (Adelberg, 1979, p.187). 
 
3.2 Social psychology perspective 
The social psychology concept of impression management originates in Goffman’s (1959) 
dramaturgical metaphor of individuals as actors on a stage performing for an audience. 
Impression management is neither the result of rational decision-making which takes the 
expected consequences of each choice into account, nor entirely motivated by material gain. 
By contrast, it is regarded as embedded in and dependent on management’s relationship with 
organisational audiences. As it arises from ‘the actual, imagined and implied presence’ 
(Allport, 1954, p.5) of organisational audiences to whom management is accountable, it is 
inherently social in character. Schlenker et al. (1994, p.634) define accountability as ‘the 
condition of being answerable to audiences for performing up to certain standards, thereby 
fulfilling responsibilities, duties, expectations, and other charges’. On the one hand, 
accountability entails the obligation of one party to provide explanations and justifications for 
its conduct to another party. On the other hand, it involves the first party’s behaviour being 
subject to the scrutiny, judgment and sanctioning of the second party. Accountability involves 
three components which affect judgement and decision-making in different ways, namely (1) 
the inquiry component, (2) the accounting component, and (3) the verdict component 
(Schlenker, 1997). The inquiry component entails anticipating or submitting to an inquiry by 
an audience who evaluates one’s actions and decisions in relation to specific prescriptions. 
The accounting component involves presenting one’s version of events. This gives the 
individual the opportunity to describe, document, interpret and explain relevant information 
with the purpose of constructing a personal account of events and providing reasons for their 
occurrence. The verdict component entails the audience delivering a verdict. This comprises 
both a judgment of the individual and the application of either social and material rewards or 
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sanctions. The experience or anticipation of an evaluative appraisal is crucial to the concept 
of accountability.  
 
Managers are accountable to organisational audiences, including shareholders and arguably 
stakeholders, for their decisions and actions. Corporate reports, particularly the annual report, 
serve as an accountability mechanism which addresses the concerns of external parties 
(Stanton and Stanton, 2002). In a corporate reporting context characterised by conditions of 
accountability, impression management arises from the inquiry component of the corporate 
reporting process. Management engages in impression management in anticipation of an 
evaluation of its actions and decisions primarily by shareholders and serves to counteract 
undesirable consequences. If corporate narrative documents are regarded as a description of 
the decision behaviour of management and thus reflect managerial performance (Prakash and 
Rappaport, 1977, p.35), then managers may be prompted to engage in impression 
management to counteract undesirable consequences of information releases in the form of 
unfavourable analyst reports and credit ratings, negative share price movements and loss of 
stakeholder support (Merkl-Davies et al., 2011).  
 
Impression management takes place in the accounting component of the accountability 
process where its manifests itself in strategies adopted by management to present a version of 
events aimed at winning social and material rewards and avoiding sanctions. This entails the 
use of self-serving bias (Aerts, 1994, 2001; Clatworthy and Jones, 2003). Research suggests 
that, in an interactive context, people’s attribution of actions and events is biased in the sense 
that they take credit for success and deny responsibility for failure (Knee and Zuckerman, 
1996). 
 
In contrast, Aerts (2005) argues that the accountability context of corporate annual reporting 
prompts managers to engage in retrospective sense-making. This concept originates in 
Weick’s (1995) work on organisational sense-making and refers to the interpretation of 
events that have already occurred. The analysis by Merkl-Davies et al. (2011) of UK 
chairmen’s statements focuses on the linguistic manifestations of the psychological processes 
underlying the inquiry component of the corporate reporting process which is characterised 
by the managerial anticipation of the feedback effects of information. They find that 
managers do not use chairmen’s statements for impression management purposes, but to 
engage in sense-making by means of retrospective framing of organisational outcomes. 
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Alternatively, managerial information processing may be characterised by bounded 
rationality. When accounting for organisational outcomes managers may provide biased 
performance explanations in order to enhance their own self-esteem by means attributing 
positive organisational outcomes to their own efforts and negative organisational outcomes to 
external factors beyond their control (egocentric bias). This egocentric bias serves the 
purpose of protecting, maintaining, or extending their beliefs about themselves or about their 
environment ‘which would be rejected if attributions followed from observations in a strictly 
rational manner’ (Forsyth, 1980, p.185). In the accounting literature, this egocentric bias is 
referred to as overconfidence bias or hubris. Hubris manifests itself in managerial optimism 
about future outcomes, overconfidence about forecasting ability and assigning too much 
weight to confirming than disconfirming evidence. Hubris is a concept which has been 
predominantly applied in explaining managerial dispositions and motives for mergers. Liu 
and Taffler (2008) investigate managerial optimism in the CEO discourse of Securities and 
Exchange Commission 8k filings of firms engaged in mergers or takeovers as a proxy for 
managerial overconfidence. 
 
3.3. Sociology perspective 
The sociology perspective regards corporate narrative reporting as determined by structural 
constraints exerted either by different stakeholder groups or by society at large. Decision-
making and action are regarded as being affected by ‘the dictates of consensually developed 
systems of norms and values, internalised through socialisation’ (Granovetter, 1985, p.483). 
Decision-making is driven by substantive, rather than instrumental rationality. Stakeholder 
theory regards impression management as an attempt on the part of management to react to 
the concerns of various stakeholder groups or to respond to public pressure and media 
attention (Hooghiemstra, 2000). Legitimacy theory regards impression management as 
arising from inconsistencies between the firm’s and society’s norms and values. It constitutes 
an attempt on the part of management to gain or restore organisational legitimacy by 
seemingly aligning the firm’s norms and values with that of society, particularly in situations 
where firms face legitimacy threats, such as corporate scandals, product safety issues and 
environmental disasters. 
 
As described earlier, firms engage in symbolic management to give the impression that their 
activities are congruent with society’s norms and values. Symbolic management strategies 
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include (i) espousing socially acceptable goals, (ii) redefining means as ends, (iii) ceremonial 
conformity (i.e. adopting specific practices considered consistent with rational management, 
even though they do not improve organisational practices), and (iv) separating negative 
events or organisational outcomes from the organisation as a whole. When organisations are 
involved in major legitimacy threatening events, such as an environmental disaster, a fraud, 
or a product recall, they aim to portray the incident as an isolated event (Suchman, 1995). For 
this purpose, they provide normalising accounts and engage in strategic restructuring. 
Normalising accounts are verbal remedial strategies, such as justifications, excuses and 
apologies whose purpose is to repair organisational legitimacy and reputation. Strategic 
restructuring entails the organisation “selectively confess[ing] that limited aspects of its 
operations were flawed” (Suchman, 1995, p.598) and then decisively and visibly remedying 
the flawed operations. This is achieved by introducing small and narrowly tailored changes, 
such as creating monitors and watchdogs, and symbolically distancing the organisation from 
negative influences by disassociation, for example, by executive replacement. Espousing 
socially acceptable goals involves, for example, claiming customer-focus or equal 
opportunities employer status, when, in effect, the opposite is the case. Redefining means as 
ends involves recasting the meaning of its ends or means, for example by justifying the 
closure of employee pension schemes on the basis of the introduction of a new accounting 
standard. Finally, an example of ceremonial conformity is public sector organisations 
producing extensive annual reports in an attempt to emulate reporting practices in the private 
sector or organisational restructuring to distance the organisation from a negative event, such 
a financial fraud (Linsley and Kajüter, 2008).  
 
Impression management in a corporate reporting context is regarded as an attempt to affect 
the public’s perceptions of the company (Hooghiemstra, 2000, Aerts and Cormier, 2009), 
either by proactively shaping stakeholders’ impressions of the organisation (i.e., 
organisational change in the form of structural organisation or privatisation; e.g. Arndt and 
Bigelow, 2000) or by reactively responding to stakeholder concerns, increased scrutiny by the 
media, or public pressure in the wake of a corporate scandal or environmental disaster (e.g., 
Elsbach, 1994; Hooghiemstra, 2000; Breton and Cote, 2006; Linsley and Kajüter, 2008; 
Lightstone and Driscoll, 2008; O’Keefe and Conway, 2008). 
 
 18 
3.4 Critical perspective 
The critical perspective questions assumptions of instrumental rationality which underlies 
mainstream impression management research. Corporate reporting decisions are assumed not 
to be primarily driven by self-interested utility maximisation, but are ideological in the sense 
that corporate narrative documents “privilege…language and thought rooted in managerial 
capitalism” (Craig and Amernic, 2004a, p.814), while marginalising the perspective of other 
stakeholders.  
 
If rationality is a social construct, managers may use corporate narrative documents to give 
the impression of rational decision-making. Organisational legitimacy is achieved by 
conforming to social ideologies of rational decision-making. In this scenario, impression 
management arises from the desire to be seen to conform to the rules and norms of society 
and to forestall the interference of external agencies in the operation of the organisation 
(Hines, 1989). Similarly, Mumby and Putnam (1992) argue that rationality is a normative 
construct of acceptable behaviour in organisations. In order to gain or maintain social 
legitimacy, managers have to present organisational outcomes and events in corporate 
narrative documents as resulting from intentional, reasoned and goal-directed behaviour. This 
involves constructing a retrospective account of organisational outcomes and events and 
providing reasons for their occurrence (Aerts, 2005). Retrospective rationality thus restores 
social legitimacy of organisational agents as rational decision-makers. In a longitudinal study 
of Amcor’s annual reports, White and Hanson (2000, p.307) note that ‘the more uncertain the 
general environment became, the more … Amcor intensified its self-presentation as rational’.  
 
Management may use rationality to justify actions and decisions. For this purpose, 
management may use accounting numbers and concepts to frame managerial decisions or 
organisational outcomes. Due to its emphasis on objectivity, measurability and lack of 
ambiguity, the use of ‘accounting rhetoric’ (for example, Craig and Amernic, 2004a; Hanson 
and White, 2003) or ‘accounting logic’ (Broadbent, 1998) lends validity, legitimacy and 
credibility to managerial decisions and actions. Organisational legitimacy is achieved by 
conforming to social ideologies of rational decision-making. Impression management thus 
entails the use of rationality to obscure ‘the ‘real’ decision processes which are political” 
(Jones, 1992, p.235). For example, in their analysis of the discourse of privatisation in the 
annual letters to shareholders of Canadian National Railway, Craig and Amernic (2008, 
p.1087) demonstrate how accounting performance measures and accounting language “have 
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been invoked to show that the vision of the promoters of the privatisation has been achieved, 
and that the decision to privatise has been a sagacious one”. 
 
Corporate narrative documents are used by managers to establish and maintain unequal 
power relationships in society in the way that they represent things and position people. 
Language is regarded as a medium through which prevailing power relations are articulated. 
Managers are regarded as powerful organisational actors who use corporate narrative 
documents to provide a hegemonic account of organisational outcomes, often by means of 
using dominant discourses. For example, in their analysis of 2001 Southwest Airlines’ Letter 
to Shareholders, Amernic and Craig (2004) highlight how management appropriates 
symbolic representations to show their company in a positive light. They demonstrate the use 
of language in corporate narrative documents to be political. 
 
4. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON RESPONSES TO IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT 
A taxonomy capturing the user perspective which mirrors that of the preparer perspective is 
developed in Figure 2. This taxonomy consists of four perspectives: the two predominant 
perspectives derived from (1) economics and (2) behavioural finance/economics; and two 
alternative perspectives grounded in (3) sociology and (4) critical theories. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates that the assumption of ‘pure’ investor rationality results in reporting bias 
to be conceptualised as ‘cheap talk’ which is ignored by investors.4 Under assumptions of 
bounded investor rationality, impression management results in short-term revisions of 
expectations about future cash flows. As shown in Figure 1, switching from instrumental 
rationality to substantive rationality and rationality as a social construct leads to alternative 
concepts of impression management as either symbolic management or retrospective 
rationality and accounting rhetoric. This also goes hand-in-hand with widening the concept of 
organisational audiences to include various stakeholder groups and the general public. 
 
Insert Figure 2 about here. 
 
                                                          
4 The reporting bias may either be due to impression management or due to managerial hubris. 
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4.1. Economics perspective 
Mainstream finance theories assume that investors behave rationally and that share prices 
incorporate information about the firm in a timely and unbiased manner. Under agency 
theory, investors can take for granted that managers act in their self-interest, rationally 
responding to incentives shaped by compensation contracts, the market for corporate control 
and other corporate governance mechanisms. The rational actor model assumes that people 
unemotionally maximise expected utility functions (Huang, 2003, p.2). In semi-strong capital 
markets, rational investors are assumed to regard biased information disclosures as ‘cheap 
talk’ (Benabou and Laroque, 1992) and ignore them, as such disclosures are costless to 
managers and difficult to verify. Demers and Vega (2010) find that investors disregard 
managerial optimism in earnings announcements, unless it is verified by outside sources such 
as financial analysts and the media, and it is accompanied by hard information. 
 
4.2. Behavioural finance/economics perspective 
Investors are only susceptible to impression management if their decision-making is 
considered to be characterised by bounded rationality. This renders investors unable to assess 
reporting bias due to a variety of cognitive, social and emotional biases. The concept of 
bounded rationality originates in cognitive psychology and is used in behavioural 
finance/economics research to study decision-making under risk and uncertainty (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979). Bounded rationality results in investors being unable to assess 
information in an unbiased and timely manner due to time constraints and cognitive and 
affective biases, such as hindsight bias, the primacy/recency effects (individuals more 
influenced by the first/last information item (Einhorn and Hogarth 1981)) and the bandwagon 
effect (see Olsen (1998) for a full list of biases impacting on investor decision-making). The 
incomplete revelation hypothesis views time constraints on the part of investors as a factor in 
investor susceptibility to impression management (Bloomfield, 2002). Information that is 
more costly to extract from publicly available data is less completely reflected in market 
prices. The easier information is to extract, the more it is impounded into share prices. Bowen 
et al. (2005) use the incomplete revelation hypothesis to explain investor reactions to 
impression management in the form of emphasising income-increasing pro-forma earnings 
numbers. They find that firms with low value relevance of earnings and greater media 
exposure place less emphasis on GAAP earnings and greater relative emphasis on pro forma 
earnings (i.e., they visually direct readers’ attention to the earnings number which shows 
financial performance in the best possible light). Li (2008) also invokes the incomplete 
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revelation hypothesis to explain why managers may choose to manipulate syntactic features 
to render the annual reports of poorly performing firms difficult to read in order to increase 
the time and effort for investors to extract information. The belief-adjustment model (Einhorn 
and Hogarth 1981) suggests that information processing is affected by the ordering of 
information. Investors may be either biased towards information presented first (primacy 
effect) or towards information presented last (recency effect). Thus, investors may attribute 
less weight to bad news and more weight to good news, depending on the order in which they 
are presented. Baird and Zelin (2000) test the belief-adjustment model and find that the 
ordering of good and bad news can influence investor perceptions. Evidence on how 
unsophisticated investors cognitively process pro forma earnings information is provided by 
Fredrickson and Miller (2004). Cognitive processes are divided between information 
acquisition and information evaluation. They find that investors are subject to unintentional 
cognitive biases, rather than consciously perceiving information to be informative. These 
unintentional cognitive biases are attributed to cognitive limitations arising from their lack of 
expertise and the use of ill-defined valuation models. Krische (2005) also finds unintentional 
investor evaluation effects arising from memory limitations. Similar to Krische (2005), Elliott 
(2006) attributes unsophisticated investor responses to the emphasis of pro forma earnings to 
unintentional cognitive effects. She posits that investors may overweigh a less important cue 
simply because it is emphasised. Managers exploit this salience effect to influence investor 
perceptions of organisational outcomes by emphasising the earnings metric that portrays 
financial performance in a positive light.  
 
The investor decision-making process is driven not only by the quality of securities’ 
underlying technical fundamentals, but also by affective evaluation (MacGregor et al., 2000; 
MacGregor, 2002; Pixley, 2002; Dreman, 2004). MacGregor et al. (2000) and MacGregor 
(2002) find that affective evaluation is based on the image associated with a particular 
company. In particular, MacGregor (2002) finds image evaluations to be correlated with 
financial judgments. Firms can exploit this association to their advantage by pro-actively 
manipulating their image and thus the perceptions of firm performance and prospects. The 
emotional impact of presentational effects has been studied in the context of visual 
information. Courtis (2004b) examines the effect of colour in annual reports and finds that 
some colours are associated with more (or less) favourable perceptions and investment 
judgements. However, it may also be present in verbal information, as language is an ideal 
medium for conveying emotion (MacGregor, 2002, p.20). Thus, readers of corporate 
 22 
narrative documents may be influenced by emotionally charged language, particularly 
similes, metaphors and other rhetorical figures. Cianci and Kaplan (2010) consider the 
influence of trust on investors’ judgements of management explanations for poor firm 
performance. They examine the influence of CEO reputation and the plausibility of 
management explanations, finding that investor judgements are not influenced by CEO 
reputation. 
 
4.3 Sociology perspective 
The sociological perspective conceptualises impression management as symbolic 
management. Symbols manipulate audience’s perceptions of the congruence of organisational 
practices with social norms and rules. The focus of analysis is on perceptions of 
organisational legitimacy. Research investigates the impact of impression management 
relating to organisations’ environmental performance on organisational audiences. Archival 
research predominates. This entails assessing shareholder perceptions by means of share price 
reactions and stakeholder perceptions by means of media accounts. Applying institutional 
theory, Bansal and Clelland (2004) investigate shareholder responses to corporate 
environmental legitimacy and impression management relating to environmental performance 
(disclosure of environmental liabilities and expression of environmental commitment). 
Investors are assumed to assess corporate environmental legitimacy according to the firm’s 
conformity to accepted social structures. They find that firms which adopt institutional norms 
gain legitimacy which lowers their unsystematic stock market risk. Berrone et al. (2009) 
investigate organisational audiences’ perceptions of corporate environmental legitimacy. 
They find that symbolic management does not have the same impact on environmental 
legitimacy compared to substantive management. They conclude that symbolic management 
is not unimportant in the sense that symbolic and substantive management are 
complementary rather than supplementary. 
 
4.4 Critical perspective 
We are unaware of accounting research exploring whether readers of corporate narrative 
documents are persuaded by the use of retrospective rationality and accounting rhetoric to 
give the impression of rational decision-making and/or to persuade organisational audiences 
about the validity and legitimacy of managerial actions and decisions. Research in linguistics 
suggests that rhetoric constitutes an effective means of giving universal status to particular 
discourses, for example the discourse of New Public Management which includes the use of 
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accounting rhetoric to persuade audiences of the advantages of a market orientation in the 
public sector (Fairclough, 2003). If audiences are persuaded by the use of accounting 
concepts and numbers in corporate narrative documents to justify managerial actions and 
decisions, this reinforces the status quo by promoting ignorance in the sense that ‘the 
company maintain[s] a privileged position regarding information by keeping society unaware 
of alternative avenues of consumption, or systems of organisation or its present and future 
performance’ (Simpson, 2000, p.245).  
 
5. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This paper commenced with a criticism of the narrow concept of economic rationality which 
underlies the predominant economics-based approach to impression management research 
(Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007). Research based on economic rationality assumes that the 
decision-making of organisational actors and audiences involves taking the expected 
consequences of each choice into account and that these decisions are driven by self-
interested utility-maximisation. This is reductionist in the sense that managerial corporate 
reporting decisions and responses to these decisions are regarded as abstracted from real 
decision-making, driven by a narrow view of human behaviour based on prospective 
rationality and motivated solely by material gain.  
 
 We introduce alternative concepts of impression management based on theories from 
psychology/behavioural finance, sociology and critical perspectives which are based on 
different assumptions regarding the rationality and motivation of managers and organisational 
audiences. These inform the way discretionary corporate narrative disclosures are interpreted 
and the way impression management is conceptualised. By making these underlying 
assumptions explicit, we contribute to the quality of future research by highlighting the 
importance of consistency between underlying assumptions, predictions and interpretations of 
results. Identifying, classifying and challenging assumptions regarding the rationality and 
motivation of managers and organisational audiences may help researchers to think 
differently about what is already known (Foucault, 1985). 
 
5.1 Concepts of impression management 
Depending on the theoretical perspective adopted and the focus of analysis (i.e. management 
versus organisational audiences), impression management is conceptualised as opportunistic 
managerial discretionary disclosure behaviour, reporting bias, self-serving bias, symbolic 
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management and cheap talk. Insights from psychology, sociology and critical perspectives 
show impression management as a multifaceted and complex phenomenon aimed at shaping 
the perceptions of a wide range of outside parties. Sociological and critical approaches shift 
the focus of analysis away from specific impression management tactics to broader strategies 
used to present a particular version of events, such as rhetoric (see, for example, Driscoll and 
Crombie, 2001; Livesey, 2002; Craig and Amernic, 2004b, 2006, 2008) or symbolic 
management (see, for example Linsley and Kajüter, 2008). This necessitates a more 
qualitative, in-depth analysis of corporate narrative documents aimed at uncovering how 
impressions are constructed. 
 
Relatively little is known about the influence of the content and presentation of corporate 
narrative documents on organisational audiences. Corporate report readers have been profiled 
in terms of their sophistication (sophisticated and unsophisticated) and their information 
acquisition strategies (goal directed/purposeful and incidental/random) (Courtis, 2000, p.255–
58; Courtis and Hassan, 2002, p.398–99). The former acquire information by seeking answers 
to preconceived questions and search sections of the annual report for answers to specific 
questions, while the latter merely browse through the annual report and read bits and pieces 
as take their fancy. There is little evidence on the information acquisition strategies 
undertaken by different strata of that audience. Nor has the relationship between information 
inductance, framing and impression management been adequately explored. These questions 
need to be addressed in future research. 
 
5.2 New methodological approaches 
The majority of impression management research is archival. Research on the preparer 
perspective is primarily based on textual analysis. The problem with archival research is that 
the underlying decision-processes and motivations have to be inferred. This problem may be 
overcome in future research by using methods which allow a more direct access to 
organisation actors’ decision-making and motivation. The concepts introduced in this study 
can be used by researchers as a theoretical framework to inform their interactions with 
organisational actors and audiences in field studies and interviews. There is some research on 
the drivers of disclosures in the narrative documents of various organisations. Findings 
suggest that different disclosure positions may co-exist in one firm (Gibbins et al., 1990; 
Adams, 1997) and that disclosure positions may differ across different corporate narrative 
documents (Jetty and Beattie, 2009). This means that impression management forms part of 
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the disclosures made within one particular narrative document, that different manifestations 
of impression management may co-exist in one document, and that impression management 
may be more prevalent in specific types of corporate narrative documents. 
 
There is less research on the perception of narrative disclosures by organisational audiences. 
This is at least partly due to the difficulty of capturing the response of organisational 
audiences other than shareholders to impression management by conventional archival 
methods. Research on the user perspective predominantly focuses on shareholder responses 
to impression management by means of share price reaction studies. Some researchers have 
used experimental approaches to proxy shareholder reactions (Stanton et al., 2004; Barton 
and Mercer, 2005; Krische, 2005; Elliott, 2006). Bansal and Clelland’s (2004) and Breton 
and Cote’s (2006) approach of using media accounts as a proxy for public perception may be 
a way forward. Solomon et al. (2009) interview 20 institutional investors in relation to 
impression management and private social and environmental reporting. Although their focus 
is not on social and environmental disclosures in corporate reports, their study nonetheless 
provides an example of a different approach to studying investor perceptions of impression 
management in a corporate reporting context. They find evidence of impression management, 
which is of concern, since the objective of private social and environmental disclosures is to 
encourage relationship investing by engendering trust, confidence and transparency in the 
relationship between companies and their core institutional investors. In conclusion, different 
methodological approaches provide opportunities to address new research questions dealing 
with preparer and user perspectives. 
 
5.3 Interaction between managers and organisational audiences  
Prior research conceptualises impression management as a process consisting of two separate 
stages, namely (1) managerial impression management, primarily by means of corporate 
narrative documents, such as annual reports and press releases, and (2) audience responses to 
impression management. Ginzel et al. (2004) argue that impression management constitutes 
an interactive process between managers and audiences. The social psychology perspective of 
impression management introduced in Section 3.2 shows that impression management can be 
regarded as being triggered by the anticipation of the reactions of information recipients to 
managerial disclosures. Ginzel et al. (2004, p.225) argue that this ‘process of reciprocal 
influence’ between management and organisational audiences is not necessarily confined to 
an ‘initial attempt…to explain an organisation’s actions or performance’. In cases where 
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impression management attempts are not successful in the sense that audiences are not 
convinced, the impression management process extends to a third stage during which 
management and audiences attempt to resolve interpretive conflicts regarding the appropriate 
interpretation of an event, resulting in possible modifications in interpretations. Driscoll and 
Crombie’s (2001) analysis of a conflict between a large timber firm and a small monastery 
situated in a forest where the firm is operating is a rare example of a study of impression 
management as an interactive process between two parties. They find that the timber firm 
uses language and symbolic activity strategically to increase its own legitimacy and decrease 
the legitimacy of the convent. 
 
5.4 Concluding comments 
Impression management is a much richer and more complex phenomenon than suggested by 
the predominant economics-based perspective. Insights from disciplines conceptualising the 
relationship between managers and organisational audiences as going beyond market 
exchange and which either focus on ‘real people, real behaviour, or real reason’ (Maital, 
2004, p.1) relating to corporate narrative reporting or on the ideological motivation and 
effects of corporate narrative reporting allow us to conceptualise impression management in 
new ways. For this purpose, we develop a taxonomy which renders rationality assumptions 
and motivational components in prior research explicit and classifies prior research into four 
distinct perspectives based on these underlying assumptions. This allows us to advance 
research by assisting researchers in locating their study within a particular perspective. We 
also provide guidance on how to achieve consistency between assumptions, predictions and 
interpretation of results, leading to more informed and novel research questions depending on 
the impression management concepts adopted, the research methodologies applied and 
consideration of the interactions between preparers and users of corporate reports. 
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